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I. INTRODUCTION 
Scholars routinely credit R. H. Coase and his first seminal work—
The Nature of the Firm1—as the progenitor of the nexus-of-contracts the-
ory of the corporation.2 This account, which has dominated legal scholar-
ship for four decades, describes a corporation as a nexus of contracts be-
tween the various claimants to the earnings of the business—
shareholders, directors, officers, employees, customers, suppliers, and 
other factors of production.3 In this Article, I will argue for a different 
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 1. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 2. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. 
REV. 1, 9 (2002) (“The dominant model of the corporation in legal scholarship is the so-called nexus 
of contracts theory. This model’s origins fairly can be traced to Nobel Prize laureate Ronald Coase’s 
justly famous article, The Nature of the Firm.”); see also Angus Corbett & Peta Spender, Corporate 
Constitutionalism, 31 SYDNEY L. REV. 147 (2009) (“Since the rediscovery of the Coase Theorem by 
Jensen and Meckling in the late 1970s, corporate law theory has been dominated by economic analy-
sis which posits that the corporation is a nexus of contracts.”); David Millon, Theories of the Corpo-
ration, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 229 (1990) (noting that the nexus-of-contracts theory of the corporation 
“can be traced to Ronald Coase’s 1937 article”); Gregory Sidak, Mr. Justice Nemo’s Social Statics, 
79 TEX. L. REV. 737, 745 (2001) (“Coase’s insight that the firm is the nexus of contracts between the 
owners of various factors of production also has gained widespread acceptance among legal schol-
ars.”). 
 3. The bridge between Coase and the nexus-of-contracts definition of the firm is found in Mi-
chael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976). Jensen and Meckling noted that 
“[c]ontractual relations are the essence of the firm, not only with employees but with suppliers, 
customers, creditors, etc. . . . ” and that “most organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as 
a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals.” Id. at 310. Contractarian legal 
scholars have amplified Jensen and Meckling’s approach. See, e.g., Jonathan Macey, Fiduciary 
Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the 
Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1266 (1999) (“The first paradigm, which has its intel-
lectual origins in the work of Ronald Coase, holds that the modern, publicly held corporation is a 
nexus of contracts among the company’s various contributors.”); James McConville & Mirko 
Bagaric, Opting Out of Shareholder Governance Rights: A New Perspective on Contractual Free-
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understanding of Coase’s theory of the firm and its implications for legal 
research into the nature of the modern corporation. I will argue that nex-
us-of-contracts scholars’ claims to Coase’s lineage are based on a misap-
plication of Coase’s central insights and the pursuit of a very different 
research project than underlay The Nature of the Firm.4 Coase’s insights 
must be understood as an extension of Frank Knight’s grand opus—Risk, 
Uncertainty, and Profit5—and as an extension of Knight’s theory of the 
entrepreneur.6 So understood, Coase’s theory of the firm supports a very 
different contractarian account of the corporation than the currently dom-
inant nexus-of-contracts version, and a very different research agenda. 
So understood, the firm has boundaries and a center. So understood, the 
corporation and the firm are different phenomena. Properly understood, 
the corporation and corporation law must be seen as serving the purpose 
of providing the incorporated firm with a substitute for the entrepreneur 
who owns and directs the classical firm. 
As support for Coase’s patrimony, contractarian scholars rely on 
Coase’s terse assertion that “[a] firm . . . consists of the system of rela-
tionships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is 
dependent on an entrepreneur.”7 Moving to the modern corporation with 
                                                                                                             
dom in Australian Corporate Law, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 255, 256 (2005) (“[C]ontractarians 
view the corporation not as a separate and distinct legal entity with its own personality and post 
office box, but rather as a ‘nexus of contracts,’ a label representing the series of contracts exchanged 
and performed between suppliers, creditors, employees, employers and other stakeholders.”); David 
G. Yosifon, Towards a Firm-Based Theory of Consumption, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 447, 448–49 
(2011) (“The corporation is a ‘nexus of contracts’ comprised of all those with a stake in the firm’s 
operations, including shareholders, workers, consumers, and the broader social and political com-
munity.”). 
 4. On the notion that the nexus-of-contracts theory does not flow from Coase’s 1937 article, 
see David Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist Reimagination, 
92 GEO. L.J. 61, 106 n.277 (2003) (“Although Coase was not influential for many years after its 
publication, many legal scholars (who call themselves ‘contractarians’) came to lean on The Nature 
of the Firm as authority for the economic understanding of the firm as a nexus of con-
tracts . . . . [F]or Coase, in the first instance, the firm is anything but a nexus of contracts. Instead the 
firm is a site where the costs of continuous contracting (forming a market) outweigh the costs of 
forming the entity.”). 
 5. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921). 
 6. For extensive analysis of Knight’s theory of the entrepreneur as it relates to corporate law 
theory, see Ross B. Emmett, Frank H. Knight on the Entrepreneur Function in Modern Enterprise, 
34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1139 (2011); Charles R. T. O’Kelley, Berle and the Entrepreneur, 33 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1141 (2010) [hereinafter O’Kelley, Berle and the Entrepreneur]; Charles R. T. 
O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the Theory of the Modern Corporation, 31 J. CORP. L. 753 (2006) 
[hereinafter O’Kelley, Modern Corporation]. 
 7. Coase, supra note 1, at 393. For scholars explicitly citing this passage as the root of the 
nexus-of-contracts theory, see Thomas Blackwell, The Revolution is Here: The Promise of a Unified 
Business Entity Code, 24 J. CORP. L. 333, 349–50, 349 n.66 (1999); Alan Meese, Monopolization, 
Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm, 89 MINN. L. REV. 743, 813–19, 838 n.434 (2005); O’Kelley, 
Modern Corporation, supra note 6, at 763; Robert Rhee, Corporate Ethics, Agency, and the Theory 
of the Firm, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 309, 311–13, 323 (2008). 
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its separation of ownership and control, nexus-of-contracts theorists tell 
us that the incorporated firm is no more than the larger set of relation-
ships that exist and are made possible by the corporate form. Each of 
these contractual relationships results from the same type of rational 
maximizing behavior as is modeled in neoclassical analyses of the price 
mechanism. In effect, then, the nexus-of-contracts paradigm, as currently 
formulated, eliminates the distinction between the price mechanism and 
the firm, and it treats “the firm” and “the corporation” as simply a differ-
ent kind of market, “which serves as a focus for the complex process in 
which the conflicting objectives of individuals . . . are brought into equi-
librium within a framework of contractual relations.”8 The firm has no 
center, and the old-fashioned concept and term “the entrepreneur” has no 
function to play in a theory of the modern corporation.9 The term “the 
corporation” is a metaphor—a handy, rhetorical device—connoting the 
totality of the contractual relations between officers, directors, share-
holders, creditors, customers, suppliers, and others involved in the pro-
duction and sale process.10 Speaking of the corporation as having any 
other “reality” involves the sin of “reification.”11 
                                                 
 8. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 3, at 311. 
 9. See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 
289 (1980). Eugene Fama removed the entrepreneur from the center of the firm: 
[S]eparation of security ownership and control can be explained as an efficient form of 
economic organization within the ‘set of contracts’ perspective. We first set aside the typ-
ical presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense. The attractive 
concept of the entrepreneur is also laid to rest, at least for purposes of the large modern 
corporation. 
Id.  
 10. On “corporation” as metaphor, see Ian B. Lee, Corporate Criminal Responsibility as Team 
Member Responsibility, 31 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 755, 766 (2011) (“A corporation is not a 
thing . . . [and] this insight is captured by the metaphor of the corporation as a nexus of contracts.”); 
Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations Law, 35 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 779, 780 (2002) (“The ‘nexus of contracts’ or ‘contractarian’ model, a metaphor that at-
tempts to understand corporations in terms of ‘contracts,’ currently dominates corporations law 
scholarship.”); and Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficien-
cy, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1377 (1998) (“The nexus-of-contracts view of the corporation that so 
influenced the ALI Principles and ABA revisions . . . explicitly rel[ies] on a metaphor of private 
ordering (that of contract law) to describe the corporation . . . .”). 
 11. Jensen and Meckling first asserted this point: 
Viewing the firm as the nexus of a set of contracting relationships among individuals also 
serves to make it clear that the personalization of the firm implied by asking questions 
such as “what should be the objective function of the firm,” or “does the firm have a so-
cial responsibility” is seriously misleading. The firm is not an individual . . . . We seldom 
fall into the trap of characterizing the wheat or stock market as an individual, but we of-
ten make this error by thinking about organizations as if they were persons with motiva-
tions and intention. 
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 3, at 311; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting 
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 971 n.1 (1992) (“The corporate social 
responsibility literature, however, frequently falls into the reification trap. Reification is useful be-
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Working within the nexus-of-contracts model, scholars have strug-
gled to develop a rhetorical paradigm that accurately predicts or de-
scribes corporation law. This difficulty flows from twin flaws in the cur-
rently dominant model—the equation of the corporation and the firm and 
the exclusion of the entrepreneur. Coase and his progenitor, Frank 
Knight, saw the firm as having an “inside” and an “outside” and a dis-
tinct central actor—the entrepreneur. Contrary to the allocation of re-
sources by the unconscious processes of the market fundamental to the 
perfect competition model favored by free-market, nexus-of-contracts 
theorists, Knight and Coase looked inside the firm and identified the en-
trepreneur as the central economic actor; it was the entrepreneur who 
consciously allocated resources within the firm by command. If, follow-
ing Knight and Coase, we conceive of the corporation as a small inner 
circle comprised of the relations between officers, directors, and share-
holders, and the firm as a larger circle comprised of the relationships be-
tween the corporation (acting as entrepreneur–owner) and the employees 
(and other constituents), then we have the beginning point for a compre-
hensive theory of the incorporated firm. The rhetorical device that this 
model suggests is entrepreneur primacy, the claim that corporation law 
serves to ensure that corporations are operated entrepreneurially. 
I develop these points by taking a fresh look at the evolution of the 
theory of the firm and then detailing how a new account of the incorpo-
rated firm is warranted. In Part II of this Article, I outline the research 
agenda that dominated mainstream economic accounts of the firm prior 
to Knight and Coase. In Part III, I sketch Knight’s seminal account of the 
entrepreneur. In Part IV, I describe Coase’s theory of the firm, placing it 
in the context of Knight’s earlier work and highlighting Coase’s im-
portant identification of the law’s place in a real world theory of the 
firm. Part V explores the implications of Coase’s seminal insights for 
corporation law scholars working to understand the modern corporation 
and the theory of the corporation that Coase’s work suggests for that 
work. Part VI provides concluding thoughts. 
                                                                                                             
cause it permits us to utilize a form of shorthand. It is easier to say ‘General Motors’ ought to do so 
and so than to describe the complex process that is actually necessary for General Motors to do 
something. Indeed, it is very difficult to think about large firms without reifying them. Reification, 
however, can be dangerous. Reification makes it easy to lose sight of the fact that firms do not do 
things; people do things. The proper focus is thus not on the corporation’s obligations, but on the 
moral obligations and legal duties of the actors who make corporate decisions.”); Marc Galanter, 
Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and its Users, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1361, 1363 
(2006) (“In the nexus view, references to corporations as actors is a fiction or reification.”). 
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II. THE BACKDROP FOR THE WORK OF KNIGHT AND COASE: THE 
PERFECT COMPETITION THEORY AND THE FIRM AS A “BLACK BOX” 
What is a “firm” and why does it exist? These questions received 
little attention prior to, and for forty or so years after, the early-twentieth 
century seminal contributions of Frank Knight in his book, Risk, Uncer-
tainty, and Profit 12 and R. H. Coase in his paper, The Nature of the 
Firm. 13  Instead, beginning in 1776 with the first publication of The 
Wealth of Nations,14 and continuing for nearly 200 years, the paramount 
project for mainstream economists was to formalize Adam Smith’s in-
sight that central economic planning is largely unnecessary.15 The prod-
uct of this effort—the perfect competition model—shows how in a per-
fectly competitive free-market economy, the maximizing behavior of 
individual producers and consumers, guided solely by price signals, 
would result in the best possible allocation of economic resources.16 
The intellectual achievement of this model is its complete abstrac-
tion from centralized control of the economy. What is modeled is 
not competition but extreme decentralization . . . . Perfect decentral-
ization is realized theoretically through assumptions guaranteeing 
that authority, or command, plays no role in coordinating resources. 
The only parameters guiding choice are those that are given—tastes 
and technologies—and those that are determined impersonally on 
markets—prices. All parameters are beyond the control of any of 
the actors or institutions, so these assumptions effectively deprive 
authority of any role in allocation.17 
While the perfect competition model transparently makes the case 
that political authority should not be used to govern the economy, it also, 
less obviously, assumes away the existence or importance of managerial 
authority within firms: 
[The perfect competition] model sets the maximizing tasks of the 
firm in a context in which decisions are made with full and free 
knowledge of production possibilities and prices . . . . “Firm” in the 
theory of price is simply a rhetorical device adopted to facilitate 
                                                 
 12. KNIGHT, supra note 5. 
 13. Coase, supra note 1. 
 14. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Random House ed. 1937) (1776). 
 15. Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 4 J. ECON. & ORG. 141, 142 (1988). 
 16. Under perfect competition, “each individual achieves the goal of rational action, maximiz-
ing the want satisfaction procurable with his given resources (whatever they are) in purchasing pow-
er, by distributing them among the alternatives according to the law of choice.” KNIGHT, supra note 
5, at 85. This is the best possible allocation of resources achievable by voluntary consent because at 
equilibrium “no individual will wish to exchange anything in his possession for anything in the 
possession of anyone else.” Id. 
 17. Demsetz, supra note 15, at 142. 
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discussion of the price system. Tasks to normally be expected of 
management are given only the most superficial, formal discussion; 
they are performed without error and costlessly, as if by a free and 
perfect computer. The real tasks of management, to devise or dis-
cover markets, products and production techniques, and actively to 
manage the actions of employees, have no place in the perfect 
[competition] model because it assumes that all products, markets, 
production techniques, and prices are fully known at zero cost.18 
Thus, if one looked solely to perfect competition theory to determine the 
nature of the firm, one might conclude that the firm is simply a black box 
that magically turns price signals into production decisions and outputs.19 
III. FRANK KNIGHT AND “THE ENTREPRENEUR” 
Frank Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty and Profit provided an important 
bridge from an economics devoid of interest in the firm to the modern 
focus on developing a theory of the firm. On one hand, Knight sought to 
bring coherence to the historic body of theoretical economics thereby 
completing the classical economists’ perfect competition theory pro-
ject.20 On the other hand, he sought to go beyond perfect competition 
theory and provide a coherent theory of imperfect competition—how the 
free enterprise system actually works. To carry out his sweeping agenda, 
Knight necessarily focused on the fundamental nature of the economic 
system and the ways in which actual economic organizations—what 
Coase later called firms—are different from the economic organizations 
that would exist under perfect competition.21  
                                                 
 18. Id. at 143. 
 19. Brian J. Loasby, Management Economics and the Theory of the Firm, 15 J. INST. ECON. 
165 (1967). The black box theory of the firm is central to perfect competition theory. 
The crux of microeconomics is the competitive system. Within the competitive model 
there is a hypothetical construct called the firm. This construct consists of a single deci-
sion criterion and an ability to get information from an external world, called the “mar-
ket.” The information received from the market enables the firm to apply its decision cri-
terion, and the competitive system then proceeds to allocate resources and produce out-
put. 
Richard M. Cyert & Charles L. Hedrick, Theory of the Firm: Past, Present, and Future; An Interpre-
tation, 10 J. ECON. LIT. 398, 398 (1972). 
 20. KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 18–19. Knight explained the project as follows: 
The aim will be to bring out the content of the assumptions or hypotheses of the historic 
body of economic thought, referred to by the classical writers as “natural price” theory. 
By this is meant, not the assumptions definitely in the minds of the classical economists, 
but the assumptions necessary to define the conditions of perfect competition, at which 
the classical thought was aimed, and which are significant as forming the limiting ten-
dency of actual economic processes. 
Id. at 18. 
 21. Id. at 264–312, 349–68. 
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Knight’s central argument was that uncertainty is the most critical 
factor to abstract from reality in order to produce perfect competition and 
that uncertainty’s presence in the real world explains the existence of the 
entrepreneur and the firm.22 Knight’s central insight was that when un-
certainty is abstracted away, there is no need for a firm or an entrepre-
neur even when division and specialization of labor are present:23 
With uncertainty entirely absent, every individual being in posses-
sion of perfect knowledge of the situation, there would be no occa-
sion for anything of the nature of responsible management or con-
trol of productive activity. Even marketing activities in any realistic 
sense would not be found. The flow of raw materials and productive 
services through productive processes to the consumer would be en-
tirely automatic . . . . There might be managers, superintendents, 
etc., for the purpose of coordinating the activities of individuals. But 
under conditions of perfect knowledge and certainty such function-
aries would be laborers merely, performing a purely routine func-
tion, without responsibility of any sort, on a level with men engaged 
in mechanical operations.24 
Knight also asserted the converse point; when uncertainty is pre-
sent, the existence of the entrepreneur and the firm naturally follows: 
With uncertainty absent, man’s energies are devoted altogether to 
doing things . . . . With uncertainty present, doing things, the actual 
execution of activity, becomes in a real sense a secondary part of 
life; the primary function or activity is deciding what to do and how 
to do it . . . .25 
With uncertainty present, producers no longer know what consumers 
want. Instead, they must forecast these wants, which involves predicting 
the future. Likewise, producers no longer know how best to organize 
production.26 As a result, “the work of forecasting and at the same time a 
                                                 
 22. Though Knight did not use the term “a firm,” without doubt he would equate that term with 
an enterprise directed by an entrepreneur. See Emmett, supra note 6, at 1140; O’Kelley, Berle and 
the Entrepreneur, supra note 6, at 1147–50. 
 23. Prior to Knight, many leading theorists viewed the firm as a natural byproduct of the divi-
sion of labor. KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 398. 
 24. KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 267. Coase, writing later, misunderstood Knight to be using the 
phrase “managers, superintendents” synonymously with the term “entrepreneur.” See Coase, supra 
note 1, at 401. Knight clearly was not using the phrases synonymously because he believed that 
entrepreneurs must be “responsible managers.” See KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 259, 267. I have ad-
dressed this point somewhat more comprehensively in a previous article. O’Kelley, Modern Corpo-
ration, supra note 6, at 768 n.103. 
 25. KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 268. 
 26. Donald J. Boudreaux & Randall G. Holcombe, The Coasian and Knightian Theories of the 
Firm, 10 MANAGERIAL DEC. ECON. 147, 151 (1989) (“Entrepreneurial judgment is the real-world 
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large part of the technological direction and control of production are 
still further concentrated upon a very narrow class of the producers, and 
we meet with a new economic functionary, the entrepreneur.”27 
IV. COASE AND THE NATURE OF THE FIRM 
A. Coase and Knight 
Coase’s The Nature of the Firm is clearly one of the most influen-
tial articles of the past century, a fact noted to be particularly remarkable 
since the article originated as a college “term paper.”28 The influence of 
Coase’s paper is also remarkable considering its limited scope in com-
parison to the sweeping work of Frank Knight.29 Indeed, The Nature of 
the Firm could be viewed as simply a small extension of Knight’s in-
sights in Risk, Uncertainty and Profit.30 Though Coase did not read Risk, 
Uncertainty and Profit until 1933, a year after Coase developed the basic 
theory set out in The Nature of the Firm, he later acknowledged that he 
undoubtedly was aware of Knight’s general ideas from discussions with 
classmates at the London School of Economics.31 Thus, Coase was indi-
rectly influenced by Knight’s work when he formed his initial thesis, and 
                                                                                                             
substitute for the hypothetical perfect foresight exercised by producers in static equilibrium mod-
els.”). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Steven N. S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–2 (1983) 
(“At about twenty years of age and before receiving a bachelor’s degree from the London School of 
Economics, Coase conceived the thesis of that work during a traveling scholarship to the United 
States in 1931–32. Considering the work started out as the equivalent of an undergraduate term 
paper one stands in awe of the insights that prompted it.”). 
 29. Upon rereading the article fifty years later, Coase himself found this remarkable: “What 
strikes me in rereading this article is its extreme simplicity. There is no subtle or complicated argu-
ment to tax the brain and no concepts difficult to understand.” R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: 
Meaning, 4 J. ECON. & ORG. 19, 20 (1988) [hereinafter Coase, Meaning]. 
 30. Bruce Kogut, Book Review, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 503, 504 (1993) (reviewing OLIVER E. 
WILLIAMSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION AND 
DEVELOPMENT) (1991) (“The notion of bounded rationality in [Coase’s definition of the firm] was 
clearly already implied by Frank Knight in his distinction of risk and uncertainty.”). 
 31. Fifty years after the publication of The Nature of the Firm, Coase reflected on Knight’s 
influence: 
And it is quite certain that I . . . had not read Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty and Profit before 
[1933]. A letter to Fowler, written in May 1933, indicates that I had just read Knight 
(along with Wicksteed, Babbage, and some Marshall). When I put forward my explana-
tion in 1932 for the existence of the firm, I had not examined these alternative explana-
tions . . . . It might of course be argued that Knight’s ideas were so much in the air at LSE 
that I would be exposed to them without reading him. And this is true. Everyone at LSE 
referred to Risk, Uncertainty and Profit whether they had read it or not . . . . Of course, 
afterwards I read Knight’s work with great care, and I have little doubt that in my later 
writings I have been greatly influenced by him . . . . 
Coase, Meaning, supra note 29, at 23. 
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the influence was direct by the time Coase transformed The Nature of the 
Firm into its final published version, as is evidenced by the extensive 
references to and comments about Risk, Uncertainty and Profit that 
Coase ultimately inserted.32 Importantly, he acknowledged that Knight’s 
book contained the then most widely accepted theory for why firms 
emerge.33   
Coase began his inquiry into the nature of the firm by focusing on 
the difference between firms and markets; while the price mechanism 
coordinates transactions between firms, within firms, the entrepreneur 
consciously organizes and coordinates production. 34  He then posed a 
broad question: Why, given the theoretical efficacy of prices in allocat-
ing resources, do firms—and the corresponding allocation of resources 
by the entrepreneur’s command—come into existence?35 As Coase con-
ceded, Knight had made a convincing case that the entrepreneur and the 
firm come to exist as a response to problems created by uncertainty.36 
Coase suggested, however, that Knight’s theory did not go far enough. In 
the real world, we observe both market transactions and transactions 
within firms. If the existence of uncertainty causes some transactions to 
be carried out within firms, why does it not cause all transactions to be 
intra-firm?37 Why are resources sometimes allocated by the price mecha-
nism and sometimes by an entrepreneur? “Why does the entrepreneur not 
organise one less transaction or one more?”38 In other words, Knight’s 
theory fails to answer a fundamental question—What explains whether a 
particular transaction will be organized outside the firm via a market 
transaction between autonomous producers, or instead, within a firm?39 
Coase’s answer to this puzzle is majestic in its simplicity.40 On one 
hand, in the real world, the price mechanism does not work costlessly; 
instead, the entrepreneur experiences transaction costs in coordinating 
production, including the costs of discovering relevant prices and enter-
ing into myriad separate contracts with factors of production.41 Accord-
ingly, firms arise when the costs of using the price mechanism increase 
                                                 
 32. See Coase, supra note 1, at 388, 392, 394, 398–401. Although Coase’s article is only nine-
teen pages in length, “Coase devotes more than six of those pages exclusively to Knight and Risk, 
Uncertainty and Profit.” O’Kelley, Berle and the Entrepreneur, supra note 6, at 1151 n.50. 
 33. Coase, supra note 1, at 398. 
 34. Id. at 387–89. 
 35. Id. at 387–90. 
 36. Id. at 392 (“It seems improbable that a firm would emerge without the existence of uncer-
tainty.”). 
 37. Id. at 394. 
 38. Id. at 393–94. 
 39. Id. at 389. 
 40. Kogut, supra note 30, at 503 (“The article is a tour de force in terms of rhetorical logic.”). 
 41. Coase, supra note 1, at 392. 
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to the point where production can be coordinated at less expense via con-
tracts with factors of production that give the entrepreneur, within limits, 
the right to direct production.42 On the other hand, firms do not operate 
costlessly either.43 Both methods of allocating resources are subject to 
various types of transaction costs. When a transaction previously orga-
nized by the price mechanism can, at less cost, be organized in a firm, 
then the price mechanism will be superseded by a new or existing firm.44 
Conversely, when the cost of organizing a transaction within the firm 
becomes greater than the cost of organizing via the market, then the 
transaction will be abandoned or avoided by the firm.45 
B. Coase’s Definition of “The Firm” 
Coase sought to develop “a definition of a firm . . . which 
is . . . realistic in that it corresponds to what is meant by a firm in the real 
world.”46 Further, he sought to explain why a firm comes into existence 
and why a firm grows or diminishes in size.47 In doing so, Coase was 
engaged in prototypical scientific problem solving: describe an actual 
state of the world and then discover the process that will produce that 
                                                 
 42. Id. at 390–92. 
 43. Id. at 394–95, 403. 
 44. While much of Coase’s 1937 article can be seen as an extension of Knight’s work, Coase’s 
insights concerning transaction costs may well derive from the influential work of Thorsten Veblen. 
Consider the following passage from one of Veblen’s most influential works: 
The amount of “business” that has to be transacted per unit of product is much greater 
where the various related industrial processes are managed in severalty than where sever-
al of them are brought under one business management. A pecuniary discretion has to be 
exercised at every point of contact or transition, where the process or its product touches 
or passes the boundary between the different spheres of ownership. Business transactions 
have to do with ownership and changes of ownership. The greater the parcelment in point 
of ownership, the greater the amount of business work that has to be done in connection 
with a given output of goods or services, and the slower, less facile, and less accurate, on 
the whole, is the work. 
THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 46–47 (Charles Scribner’s Sons ed. 
1919) (1904). For Veblen’s influence on Frank Knight, see O’Kelley, Berle and the Entrepreneur, 
supra note 6, at 1152, 1152 n.53, 1154 n.68. For Veblen’s broader influence on scholars working at 
the time of the Great Depression, see Charles R. T. O’Kelley, Berle and Veblen: An Intellectual 
Connection, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1317 (2011). 
 45. Coase, supra note 1, at 394–95. “[B]y forming an organisation and allowing some authority 
(an entrepreneur) to direct the resources, certain marketing costs are saved. The entrepreneur has to 
carry out his function at less cost . . . because it is always possible to revert to the market.” Id. at 392. 
 46. Id. at 386. 
 47. Coase understood that an essential part of a scholar’s or scientist’s task is identifying pre-
cisely the assumptions underlying a particular theory in order “to prevent the misunderstanding and 
needless controversy which arise from a lack of knowledge of the assumptions on which a theory is 
based, but also because of the extreme importance for economics of good judgment in choosing 
between rival sets of assumptions.” Coase, supra note 1, at 386. 
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state.48  Inherent in his definition was his assumption that a firm has 
boundaries—that there is an outside and an inside to the firm. According-
ly, Coase’s definition of the firm can be depicted as a circle with certain 
relations inside and certain relations crossing the boundary of the firm. 
Also inherent in his definition was his identification of the firm with the 
classical entrepreneur, a feature likewise central to the work of Frank 
Knight.49 
Coase’s definition of the firm can be distilled from the following: 
Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is co-
ordinated by a series of exchange transactions on the market. Within 
a firm, these market transactions are eliminated and [replaced by] 
the entrepreneur-co-coordinator, who directs production . . . .50 
. . . . 
A factor of production (or the owner thereof) does not have to make 
a series of contracts with the factors with whom he is co-operating 
within the firm, as would be necessary, of course, if this co-
operation were as a direct result of the working of the price mecha-
nism. For this series of contracts is substituted one. At this stage it is 
important to note the character of the contract into which a factor 
enters that is employed within a firm. The essence of the contract is 
that it should only state the limits to the power of the entrepreneur. 
Within these limits, he can therefore direct the other factors of pro-
duction . . . . A firm, therefore, consists of the system of relation-
ships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is 
dependent on an entrepreneur.51 
Thus, the Coasian firm may be depicted as a circle encompassing 
the entrepreneur and the other factors of production who have agreed to 
                                                 
 48. Herbert A. Simon, The Architecture of Complexity, 106 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. PHIL. 
SOC. 467, 479 (1962) (“‘State descriptions’ and ‘process descriptions’ are the warp and weft of our 
experience. Pictures, blueprints, most diagrams, chemical structural formulae are state descriptions. 
Recipes, differential equations, equations for chemical reactions are process descriptions. The former 
characterize the world as sensed; they provide the criteria for identifying objects, often by modeling 
the objects themselves. The latter characterize the world as acted upon; they provide the means for 
producing or generating objects having the desired characteristics.”). Coase clearly chose and valued 
problem solving in this scientific tradition: 
The approach which has just been sketched would appear to offer an advantage in that it 
is possible to give a scientific meaning to what is meant by saying that a firm gets larger 
or smaller . . . . The question which arises is whether it is possible to give a scientific 
meaning to what is meant by saying that a firm gets larger or smaller. Why does the en-
trepreneur not organize one less transaction or one more? 
Coase, supra note 1, at 393–94. 
 49. See O’Kelley, Berle and the Entrepreneur, supra note 6, at 1150–57; O’Kelley, Modern 
Corporation, supra note 6, at 758, 766–73. 
 50. Coase, supra note 1, at 388 (emphasis added). 
 51. Id. at 391, 393 (emphasis added). 
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provide services subject to the entrepreneur’s direction. The entrepreneur 
and employees are inside the firm. All factors of production with whom 
the entrepreneur transacts via the price mechanism are outside the firm. 
The firm—the totality of the circle—is the system of relations between 
the entrepreneur and other factors of production who have agreed to act 
as directed by the entrepreneur.52 
C. The Relationship Between Law and the Definition of the Firm 
Does this definition achieve Coase’s goal—“a definition of a 
firm . . . which is . . . realistic in that it corresponds to what is meant by a 
firm in the real world”?53 Strikingly, Coase viewed the real world defini-
tion of the firm to be intertwined with legal concepts. 
We can best approach the question of what constitutes a firm in 
practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that of 
“master and servant” or “employer and employee.” The essentials of this 
relationship have been given as follows: 
(1) The servant must be under the duty of rendering personal ser-
vices to the master or to others on behalf of the master, otherwise 
the contract is a contract for the sale of goods or the like. 
(2) The master must have the right to control the servant’s work, ei-
ther personally or by another servant or agent . . . . 
We thus see that it is the fact of direction which is the essence of the 
legal concept of “employer and employee” just as it was in the [def-
inition of the firm] developed above.54 
Explicit in Coase’s use of agency law as the real world check on his the-
ory of the firm is his understanding that agency law is the institution that 
gives ultimate authority to the master (the entrepreneur, owner, or em-
ployer) to direct the actions of employees. Direction—allocation of re-
sources by the entrepreneur—is the essence of the firm. In the real world, 
employees and employers experience this relationship between employer 
and employee as the essence of the firm. Law—particularly the law of 
                                                 
 52. Viewed in isolation, Coase’s statement that a “firm . . . consists of the system of relation-
ships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur” 
could be interpreted to support a nexus-of-contracts definition of the firm. Under such an interpreta-
tion, “the firm” would include relations not only between the entrepreneur and employees but also 
relationships between and among the entrepreneur, employees, customers, suppliers, and other 
stakeholders of the firm. But this interpretation would be incompatible with Coase’s larger thesis 
that the firm exists as an alternative to the price mechanism for directing productive resources, and 
would also be inconsistent with Coase’s problem-solving goal—to show why this alternative to 
market allocation even exists. 
 53. Coase, supra note 1, at 386. 
 54. Id. at 403–04. 
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master and servant—makes this relationship possible. Thus, the essence 
of the firm is inextricably intertwined and dependent on the authority that 
law provides to the entrepreneur.55 
V. A KNIGHT–COASIAN APPROACH TO THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
CORPORATION LAW RESEARCH 
A. The “Corporation” as Sole-Proprietor Surrogate 
Put in contractarian terminology, the sole proprietor, the classic en-
trepreneur, is the nexus of contracts in the classic firm.56 Coase, however, 
did not address the question posed by the modern corporation: What is 
the nexus of the firm when ownership and control are separated? Most 
nexus-of-contracts scholars see shareholders, directors, and officers as 
occupying the same contractual boat as other corporate constituencies; 
employees, customers, creditors, suppliers, directors, officers and share-
holders each enter into voluntary contractual relationships with the nexus 
of the firm—the empty and essentially meaningless artificial corporate 
entity.57 This depiction eliminates the entrepreneur and the entrepreneur 
function from the theory of the firm.58 
                                                 
 55. Contractarians recoil at the notion that authority (direction of resource by command) is the 
essence of the firm. The strongest (and most quoted) statement of the contractarian viewpoint is 
found in Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Or-
ganization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777 (1972) (“It is common to see the firm characterized by the 
power to settle issues by fiat, by authority, or by disciplinary action superior to that available in the 
conventional market. This is delusion. The firm does not own all its inputs. It has no power of fiat, 
no authority, no disciplinary action any different in the slightest degree from ordinary market con-
tracting between any two people.”). For a convincing refutation of this contractarian view, see Scott 
Masten, A Legal Basis for the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 186 (1988). 
 56. For a much earlier look at the corporation as sole-proprietor-surrogate, see Charles R. T. 
O’Kelley, The Theory of the Firm: The Corporation as Sole-Proprietor Surrogate, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1858936 (last updated Sept. 30, 2001). 
 57. As Edward Rock and Michael Wachter powerfully described, the problem with the nexus-
of-contracts definition is that it leaves the corporation empty: 
[A]s a motivating theory for corporate law or for business associations in general, a 
weakness of the nexus of contracts approach is that the firm as an operating unit appears 
to be without a core and without “insiders,” as the term is normally under- 
stood . . . . Because the nexus view defines the various constituencies by their contractual 
rights, the firm is merely the total grouping of those relationships. In one respect, em-
ployees, including executive officers, are no more insiders than are individual suppliers, 
each described by their “contract” with the corporation. 
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-
Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1628–29 (2001). Responding to this emptiness, 
Stephen Bainbridge has generated numerous articles promoting his theory of director primacy. See, 
e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003); Stephen Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Conver-
gence Debate, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 45 (2002); Bainbridge, supra note 2. Like Rock and Wachter, 
Bainbridge sees that the standard nexus-of-contracts account leaves the firm without the entrepre-
neurial center provided by Knight and Coase’s theory. Bainbridge seeks to fill this void not by 
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Conceiving of the corporation as the vibrant, entrepreneurial (and 
nonempty) center of the firm solves this error. So viewed, the corpora-
tion is a surrogate for the entrepreneur. Viewed as a circle, the corpora-
tion encompasses the contractual and legal relations between, and the 
contractual and legal responsibilities of, the shareholders, directors, and 
officers; it is these relations and responsibilities that constitute what we 
call “the corporation” and that determine how the entrepreneurial role is 
carried out in an incorporated firm. It is these relationships that are the 
subject of corporation law. The Coasian firm is a larger circle encom-
passing the corporation and the relations between the corporation and the 
firm’s employees. Finally, the revised nexus-of-contracts firm is an even 
larger circle encompassing the corporation and not only employees but 
also suppliers, customers, and other contractual constituencies.   
If we take as a starting point Coase’s seminal insight that allocation 
of resources by the entrepreneur’s direction is the essence of the firm, 
then the central research question posed by the modern corporation fol-
lows: How is the entrepreneur function carried out in the modern corpo-
ration with separation of ownership functions among multiple roles? For 
legal scholars, there is a specialized subpart to this research question: 
How do the corporation and corporation law help solve the problems in-
herent in the separation of ownership and control famously identified by 
Knight, and Berle and Means? Viewing the corporation as a surrogate for 
the entrepreneur, and as encompassing the relations and obligations of 
the shareholders, directors, and officers, facilitates analysis of this ques-
tion. 
As we have seen, Coase first sought to define the firm and then to 
illuminate the process that resulted in the firm’s existence and deter-
mined its boundaries. But the only dimension of the firm that he sought 
to explain was the allocation of resources pursuant to the hierarchical 
                                                                                                             
breathing life into the corporation as entrepreneur surrogate, but rather by suggesting that one set of 
the corporation’s constituent actors—the board of directors—is the sole nexus of contracts. Like 
shareholder primacy theories and Blair and Stout’s team production scholarship (Margaret M. Blair 
& Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999)), Bain-
bridge’s insights contribute to a study of relationships and duties within the corporation, but his 
theory does not support or provide a comprehensive descriptive account of the corporation or corpo-
ration law. These points are further elaborated in O’Kelley, Modern Corporation, supra note 6, at 
772–77. 
 58. See Boudreaux & Holcombe, supra note 26, at 154 (“[A] fully adequate theory of the firm 
cannot be developed within a general-equilibrium setting because one of the key characteristics of a 
firm is decision-making under uncertainty—i.e. where vectors of outputs and prices are not known 
by decision makers. By working implicitly within the framework of general equilibrium, contempo-
rary theorists, following Coase, have assumed away some important aspects of the firm’s environ-
ment. These aspects are the fundamental building blocks of Knight’s theory of the firm, and their 
explicit recognition promises a richer and more complex theory of enterprise and of the firm.”). 
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direction of the entrepreneur. In other words, Coase found the essence of 
the firm to be the direction of resources pursuant to the entrepreneur’s 
command because his research agenda was to explain why such interfirm 
allocation of resources via the entrepreneur’s command occurs at all, and 
because it does, why a particular transaction is organized within the firm 
instead of via the market. Other dimensions of business organizations, 
such as the nature of capital ownership,59 or the reasons why some re-
sources are allocated within a sole proprietorship by the entrepreneur–
owner and other transactions are coordinated by a more complex corpo-
rate hierarchy,60 were simply not part of Coase’s research agenda and 
therefore not necessary to his definition of the firm. 
Fortunately, Coase’s insight meshes easily with a revised nexus-of-
contracts account. Under this revised account, the corporation is a part of 
the standard-form contract that shareholders, directors, and officers vol-
untarily select when they initially choose to organize business relation-
ships as a corporation.61 Importantly, “the corporation” is not the same 
thing as “the firm,” but rather a by-product of contractual bargaining be-
tween a subset of the firm’s constituents who voluntarily choose to or-
ganize their business relationship by forming a corporation and agreeing 
to act as the corporation’s officers, directors, and shareholders. The cor-
poration is a subset of the relationships that constitute the firm, but a very 
special subset, because corporation law assigns to the corporation the 
role of sole-proprietor-surrogate. Thus, a fundamental first purpose of 
corporation law is to provide “the corporation” and its internal govern-
ance rules as a surrogate for the sole proprietor, and to determine how the 
rights, responsibilities, and rewards of the sole proprietor will be allocat-
ed to and among the persons replacing the sole proprietor—the corpora-
tion’s shareholders, directors, and officers.62 
                                                 
 59. For a discussion of the implications of Coase’s theory of the firm for corporate finance and 
the implications of corporate finance for a theory of the firm, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Finance and 
the Firm, 152 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 89 (1996). 
 60. Following in Coase’s footsteps, transaction-cost economists continue to refine our under-
standing of the design and purpose of alternative business organization structures. See, e.g., OLIVER 
E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1998); Charles R. T. O’Kelley, 
Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 
216 (1992); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific 
Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913 (1999). 
 61. ERIC W. ORTS, SHIRKING AND SHARKING: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 265, 299 (1998) 
(“Firms of more than one person are better described not as a nexus of contracts, but as a nexus of 
agency relationship. In the language of contractarian theory, saying that a firm is a nexus of con-
tracts leads one to ask: What creates the nexus? Only a legal theory of the firm can answer the ques-
tion: agency and the legal recognition of specific forms of organization.”). 
 62. I argue that this first purpose is not morally relativistic—responsibilities and rewards are 
not allocated or allocable against a value-neutral backdrop. Instead, the fundamental purpose of 
corporation law is to see that responsibilities and rewards are allocated so as to provide the firm with 
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The nature of the corporation as sole-proprietor-surrogate is illumi-
nated by considering the nature of the classic firm—a sole proprietorship 
in which the proprietor is the firm’s entrepreneur–manager and owns the 
firm’s means of production.63 From Coase’s viewpoint, the classic firm 
consists of the system of relationships which comes into existence when 
the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur.64 Thus, if de-
picted as a circle, the Coasian firm encompasses the entrepreneur and the 
employees that she directs. In contrast, from the nexus-of-contracts per-
spective, the classic firm consists of the relationships between the entre-
preneur and not only her employees, but also the firm’s suppliers, cus-
tomers, lenders, lessors, and other constituents. Accordingly, the nexus-
of-contracts definition of the classic firm would be captured pictorially 
by a circle encompassing that wider set of relationships. From both the 
Coasian and nexus-of-contracts perspectives, however, the terms “the 
firm” and the “sole proprietorship” denote the same phenomena—the set 
of relations that are deemed to constitute the firm. 
Still, there is another concept to consider in examining the classic 
firm—the sole proprietor. Where does the sole proprietor fit in the de-
scription of the firm? It seems indisputable that the term “the sole propri-
etor” does not denote the same phenomena as the terms “the firm” and 
“the sole proprietorship,” but rather denotes the role undertaken by one 
of the individuals involved in the contractual relations within the firm—
the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur differs from the other constituents of 
the sole proprietorship in that she is a party to every contract as well as 
the owner and provider of the sole proprietorship’s equity capital. Thus, 
the sole proprietorship should be defined as the set of relations between 
the sole proprietor and the other constituents of the firm and should be 
depicted as a circle encompassing all of these relations. At the center of 
this circle is the sole proprietor—the common party to all of the contrac-
tual relationships. 
Does this understanding of the sole proprietorship make it appro-
priate to describe “the sole proprietor” as “the owner” of the firm? Not 
from the nexus-of-contracts perspective: 
                                                                                                             
the best possible entrepreneurial direction. Put differently, corporation law is not agnostic as to the 
governance choices made by the corporation’s constituents: corporation law is intended to guide 
corporate constituencies in the direction of entrepreneurial management. 
 63. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 55, at 783, provide the standard economic definition of the 
rights attendant to the sole proprietor, the owner and entrepreneur in the classical firm: 
It is this entire bundle of rights: 1) to be a residual claimant; 2) to observe input behavior; 
3) to be a central party common to all contracts with inputs; 4) to alter the membership of 
the team; and (5) to sell these rights, that define the ownership (or the employer) of the 
classical (capitalist, free-enterprise) firm. 
 64. Coase, supra note 1, at 386, 394. 
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[O]wnership of capital should not be confused with ownership of 
the firm. Each factor in a firm is owned by somebody. The firm is 
just the set of contracts covering the way inputs are joined to create 
outputs and the way receipts from outputs are shared among inputs. 
In this “nexus of contracts” perspective, ownership of the firm is an 
irrelevant concept.65 
It is, of course, true that the individual who assumes the role of sole 
proprietor does not “own” the individuals who assume the role of em-
ployee.66 The sole proprietor, however, does possess a position within the 
firm and a bundle of property rights that are generally described as the 
powers and position of an owner. First, the proprietor is the locus of, the 
common party to, all contracts with the firm’s factors of production. Se-
cond, the proprietor owns or otherwise controls the firm’s productive 
capital—the means of production. Third, the proprietor has the legal right 
to determine with whom she associates and for how long, and this legal 
right of association extends to determining how long and to what extent 
she will allow other factors of production to have access to the firm’s 
productive assets.67 Fourth, the proprietor has the rights provided by the 
law of master and servant and the law of agency to determine, within 
limits, what employees and other agents will do.68 Fifth, the law of mas-
ter and servant substantially lessens the risk that employees will be able 
to misappropriate the sole proprietor’s business assets. It is with refer-
                                                 
 65. Fama, supra note 9, at 290. 
 66. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 55, make this point rather strongly. The example they use 
is the customer-grocer relationship: 
[In an market exchange relationship] I can “punish” you only by withholding future busi-
ness or by seeking redress in the court for any failure to honor our exchange agreement. 
That is exactly all that any employer can do. He can fire or sue, just as I can fire my gro-
cer by stopping purchase from him or sue him for delivering faulty products . . . . Telling 
an employee to type this letter rather than to file that document is like my telling a grocer 
to sell me this bread or tuna rather than that brand of bread. 
Id. at 777. 
 67. The entrepreneur’s ability to grant, deny, or terminate access to the firm’s productive assets 
gives the entrepreneur power and makes internal governance structure critically important. See 
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387 (1998). 
 68. Of course, this right of association is symmetrical. The other members of the classical firm 
can also terminate their association with the firm at will, but when they depart they will no longer 
have access to the productive assets owned by the proprietor. Thus, upon departure, the other mem-
bers will suffer a loss to the extent that their human capital has value specific to those assets. This 
explains one aspect of the error in Alchian and Demsetz’s claim that the authority of the entrepre-
neur is no different than the customer’s ability to order her grocer to stock a certain type of bread. If 
the grocer refuses to follow the customer’s order, the customer can do no more than “fire” the gro-
cer. But if the employee refuses to follow the employer’s directions, the employer may fire the em-
ployee, which causes the employee to suffer noncompensable damages equal to the value of the 
portion of the employee’s human capital that is specialized to the employer’s assets. 
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ence to these legal rights that the sole proprietor is termed “the owner” of 
the classic firm. 
When we move to what is colloquially called “a corporation,” these 
insights concerning the sole proprietorship do not translate into an 
equality of the “the corporation” and “the firm,” but rather result in the 
realization that the term “the corporation” refers to the legal entity that 
possesses all of the rights that in the classic firm are possessed by the 
sole proprietor and to the totality of the contractual relationships between 
and among the shareholders, directors, and officers. Like the sole propri-
etor, the corporation owns the firm’s productive assets and serves as the 
locus for contractual relations. The corporation also has the legal right to 
determine who will be employed within the firm and who will provide 
supplies, and the corporation has the right to terminate these relation-
ships at will. Further, the corporation has the rights provided by the law 
of master and servant and the law of agency to determine, within limits, 
what employees and other agents will do. And finally, it is the corpora-
tion to whom the employees and agents owe fiduciary duties. 
The firm can best be depicted as a circle encompassing the relations 
between the corporation—the artificial proprietor—and the firm’s em-
ployees.69 At the center of the firm is a smaller circle—the corporation. 
Within the firm, the corporation assumes a position parallel to that which 
the sole proprietor occupies in the classic firm, and within this corporate 
circle are the contractual and legal relations and responsibilities assumed 
by the officers, directors, and shareholders. 
B. The Definition in Action 
How does the revised Coasian account of the firm that I have 
sketched above matter? I believe at the very least it facilitates a more 
accurate descriptive account of corporation law, and it facilitates com-
munication as opposed to apparent communication between scholars of 
differing viewpoints. For example, the current nexus-of-contracts ac-
count appears to support both communitarian and conservative accounts 
of the corporation.70 Coase’s reality test reveals that both of those ac-
counts cannot be right. 
The debate about corporation law’s role in protecting the interests 
of a firm’s “other constituents” (constituents other than directors, offic-
ers, and shareholders) springs from a mistaken premise—the other con-
                                                 
 69. In the Coasian firm, the corporation takes the role of the sole proprietor, and the only con-
tractual relationships that make up the firm are those between the entrepreneur and the employees. In 
the nexus-of-contracts firm, the relationships that matter are broadened to include a wider group of 
stakeholders. 
 70. See O’Kelley, Modern Corporation, supra note 6, at 765–66. 
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stituents of the firm are also constituents of the corporation. As the pre-
vious section showed, the corporation should be viewed as a surrogate 
for the sole proprietor. So viewed, the corporation encompasses only the 
governance relationship between the shareholders, officers, and directors, 
who are, thus, the corporation’s only constituents. 
A simple hypothetical illustrates this point. Assume that a sole pro-
prietor, Entrepreneur, hires Techie I, Techie II, Techie III, and Techie IV 
to work under Entrepreneur’s direction in perfecting and bringing to 
market the Product. Entrepreneur owns and provides the necessary work 
premises and equipment. Entrepreneur borrows needed capital from 
Lender and obtains supplies on credit from Supplier. From a Coasian 
perspective, this classic firm is comprised of the contractual relationships 
between Entrepreneur and his four employees; from a modern nexus-of-
contracts perspective Lender, Supplier, and perhaps other constituents 
would also be included. If we depicted this firm as a circle, Entrepreneur 
would be at the center representing her place as the common party to all 
contractual relations. But Entrepreneur also should be depicted at the 
center of the firm because she is the owner of the firm as the concept of 
ownership is commonly understood. 
Now consider the plight of the most vulnerable constituents of this 
classic firm. The employees are subject to the law of master and servant. 
Thus, they owe fiduciary duties to Entrepreneur, yet she owes no fiduci-
ary duties to the employees. Even though the employees’ well-being de-
pends on the efficacy of Entrepreneur’s business decisions, the employ-
ees have no right to participate in the making of important policy deci-
sions, no right to replace Entrepreneur if she proves unskillful or oppor-
tunistic, and no right to sue Entrepreneur for damages that the employees 
suffer as a result of Entrepreneur’s negligent operation of the firm’s 
business. 
Now suppose that Entrepreneur incorporates her sole proprietorship 
under the name Corporation in order to obtain the benefits of limited lia-
bility, and she initially allocates to herself all of the corporation’s shares 
and its one authorized directorship. The firm now constitutes the rela-
tionships between Corporation and Corporation’s employees, Supplier, 
and Lender. The changes in our description of the firm effected by this 
reorganization are the following: the firm is now depicted as a circle en-
compassing the contractual relations between Corporation and the other 
constituents of the firm; Corporation is located at the center of the firm 
representing Corporation’s place as common party to all contracts and 
status as owner; Entrepreneur is now depicted as within Corporation, rep-
resenting Entrepreneur’s position as the corporation’s officer, sharehold-
er, and director. As the only constituent of the corporation, the provisions 
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of corporation law apply only to Entrepreneur. Importantly, as before 
incorporation, the employees still owe the proprietor fiduciary duties and 
must follow the proprietor’s directions. As before, the proprietor does not 
owe fiduciary duties to the employees. The only difference is that the 
proprietor is now the corporation, Corporation. 
Now suppose Techie I and Techie II threaten to quit, and Entrepre-
neur concludes the firm will fail without their unique skills. At the same 
time, Lender demands an equity interest in the corporation. Accordingly, 
the corporation is reorganized so that Techie I, Techie II, Entrepreneur, 
and Lender each own 25% of the corporation’s shares. The board is ex-
panded from one position to three, and the new positions are filled by 
Techie I and Lender. Entrepreneur continues to serve as the corporation’s 
CEO, and Techie I and Techie II continue to provide services to the cor-
poration as nonexecutive employees. 
This change in our hypothetical highlights a flaw in the communi-
tarian analysis of the relative contractual standing of various corporate 
constituents. In our hypothetical, each individual has bargained for a par-
ticular set of contractual rights: Techie I has bargained for share owner-
ship, a director position, and the status of employee; Techie II has bar-
gained for share ownership and the status of employee; Lender has bar-
gained for share ownership and lender status; Techie III and Techie IV 
have bargained only to be employees; Supplier has bargained only for 
the contractual relationship of supplier. Some individuals have bargained 
to have corporation law rights and relationships, some have not. Those 
who have bargained for corporation law rights and responsibilities as 
officers, directors, or shareholders, have struck different bargains in 
terms of their position within the corporation. What is the descriptive 
basis in the nature of the firm for reordering the bundle of rights and du-
ties for which each party has contracted?71 
Finally, we can expand this hypothetical to include additional 
shareholders, employees, directors, and other constituents. Corporation 
may eventually “go public” and add thousands of individuals to the ranks 
                                                 
 71. The point here, is that a descriptive (predictive theory) of the modern American corpora-
tion, does not coincide with reality if it shows or predicts that ordinary stakeholders (those playing 
roles other than as officers, directors, or shareholders) have an entrepreneurial decision-making or 
risk-taking role in the corporation. There is an enormous body of literature explicitly making norma-
tive claims for why corporate stakeholders should receive enhanced substantive and procedural 
rights. For insight into that literature and how it relates to the nexus-of-contracts theory of the firm, 
see Neil A. Shankman, Reframing the Debate Between Agency and Stakeholder Theories of the 
Firm, 19 J. BUS. ETHICS 319 (1999). Those normative arguments must rise or fall on grounds other 
than a theory of how corporations are in fact governed. 
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of its shareholders.72 Let us also assume that despite having her equity 
ownership and voting power diluted to 25%, Entrepreneur continues as 
CEO (though it would not affect our analysis of the firm if she did not). 
Some of the new shareholders may be nonexecutive employees, some 
may be key executives and directors, and some may otherwise be 
strangers to the firm. The legal and contractual rights and duties that flow 
from these new share issuances will go into the mix of governance and 
ownership relationships that make up the corporation. Some of these new 
shareholders will also have relationships, perhaps as nonexecutive em-
ployees, that will properly be described as within the firm, but not within 
the governing corporation. Perhaps some of the buyers of these newly 
issued shares will have existing or concurrently created relationships 
with the firm as officers or directors; these relationships too should be 
viewed as within the corporate circle. And some of these new share own-
ers will have relationships with the firm only as shareholders, and those 
relationships will fall inside the corporate boundary as well. 
These insights lead to the following description of the more com-
plex organization—the modern, publicly traded corporation. The Coasian 
firm still encompasses the contractual relations between Corporation and 
its nonofficer employees, and the nexus-of-contracts firm still encom-
passes not only the relationships with nonofficer employees but also the 
relationships with other constituencies. Corporation is still the sole-
proprietor-surrogate standing at the center of the firm. Corporation, how-
ever, now encompasses the myriad relationships between and among the 
firm’s CEO (Entrepreneur) and the other individuals who occupy the 
status of officer, director, and shareholder. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Nexus-of-contracts scholars caution against reifying the corpora-
tion.73 The same caution should be applied to the many other legal and 
nonlegal concepts that we use in our corporate law scholarship and to use 
of the concept of reification, a concept we are little trained to under-
                                                 
 72. Missing from most accounts of the modern corporation is how firms arise and how they 
(sometimes) become publicly traded corporations with widely dispersed share ownership. Knight’s 
overarching theory provides the vehicle for this type of analysis: 
Knight’s discussion facilitates a dynamic perspective on firms, from their entrepreneurial 
beginnings to their widely held corporate forms. This perspective alerts us to the fact that 
at the time of a firm’s IPO, its ownership rights are already in the possession of the entre-
preneur(s), and if we accept the rights of an individual to the ownership and sale of pri-
vate property, then it is difficult to argue against the entrepreneur’s rights to sell his prop-
erty (i.e. ownership) to investors. 
S. Ramakrishna Velamuri & S. Venkataraman, Why Stakeholder and Stockholder Theories Are Not 
Necessarily Contradictory: A Knightian Insight, 61 J. BUS. ETHICS 249, 259 (2005). 
 73. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
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stand.74 Terms such as “employer,” “director,” and “officer” refer to le-
gal roles that may be assumed by human actors, but these roles are not 
“real” any more than a corporation is “real.”  Human actors may take on 
multiple roles within a firm. Some of these roles, and the associated con-
tractual and legal rights and responsibilities, may best be described as 
belonging within the corporation. Other roles and associated contractual 
and legal rights may be best described as belonging within the firm but 
outside of the corporate inner core. Real human actors may occupy mul-
tiple roles, some of which are within the corporate circle and some of 
which are only within the larger circle bounding the firm. And, of course, 
human actors will occupy many roles outside of the boundaries of the 
firm. Clarity of thinking and debate in corporate law scholarship would 
be greatly enhanced if each of us carefully refrained from equating roles 
and human beings. 
That said, viewing the corporation as a nonempty, entrepreneurial 
center of the firm is not reification. Rather, this model depicts the reality 
of corporate governance, and the use of this model will promote clear 
thinking about the nature of the incorporated firm. The power to make 
entrepreneurial decisions is not an afterthought or a mere economic theo-
                                                 
 74. Sociologists, anthropologists, and philosophers provide us with a treasure trove of scholar-
ship about reification. Importantly, reification should be understood from both the institutional (ho-
listic) and individualist perspectives: 
Reification is: 
The error of regarding an abstraction as a real phenomenon. The source of the 
error lies in the fact that in analysis it is necessary to simplify the complex 
phenomena of the real world, and in developing analytic concepts aspects of a 
given phenomenon must be ignored in order to focus on other aspects. (Mod-
ern Dictionary of Sociology) 
This general definition includes the more typical individualist charge of reification 
against holists for the inappropriate application following from “misapprehending a hu-
man relationship as a thing.” It includes the also the less recognized error of individual-
ists for the inappropriate application of idealized conceptions of people following from 
“the mental conversion of a person or abstract concept into a thing” (Oxford English Dic-
tionary). Reification in the first instance is the negative consequences from the incorrect 
imposition of abstract relationships on complex human behavior. Reification in the se-
cond instance is the negative consequences from the inappropriate imposition of an ab-
stracted individual on complex human behavior. 
. . . . 
There is nothing inherently wrong in the abstraction and application of a “guiding image-
ry.” The problem is one of fit between the applied image and actual complex human be-
havior; whether its application leads us forward. Guiding images are misleading when 
their imposition distracts from our analyses to overly simple dispositional characteristics, 
boundaries, and reciprocal interdependencies when the critical issues are understanding 
very complex interactions, relationships, and orientations. 
Richard A. Colignon, Reification: The “Holistic” and “Individualistic” Views of Organizations, 18 
THEORY & SOC. 83, 83–84 (1989) (footnote omitted); see also Ian Ashman & Diana Winstanley, 
For or Against Corporate Identity? Personification and the Problem of Moral Agency, 76 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 83 (2007); Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Rethinking Reification, 16 THEORY & SOC. 263 (1987). 
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ry; it is a central organizing feature of the corporation and corporate law. 
All relations within the incorporated firm are not the same. Some are 
“more equal” than others: the corporation is a surrogate for the sole pro-
prietor, and the relationships that matter most, and are best described as 
comprising the corporation, are those pertaining to the roles of share-
holders, officers, and directors. 
 
